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Abstract 
In the current study, we examined the influence of schema consistency on contradictory 
and additive misinformation. Sixty-four participants were shown a series of still photo-
graphs of common scenes (e.g., a kitchen), were later exposed to narratives containing 
misinformation, and were then tested on their memory of the photographic scenes. In ad-
dition, participants were asked to reflect on their phenomenological experience of remem-
bering by giving remember/know responses. Participants reported greater false memory 
for schema-inconsistent items than schema-consistent items. The findings failed to repli-
cate Roediger, Meade, and Bergman (2001). Explanations for the discrepant findings are 
discussed.
The research of Elizabeth Loftus and her colleagues has strongly influenced our 
understanding of memory. Some of her earliest and most pervasive contributions 
have resulted from the delineation of the misinformation effect (Loftus, 1975; Loftus, 
Miller, & Burns, 1978; Loftus & Palmer, 1974). One of the most consistent observa-
tions in cognitive psychology involves participants falsely remembering misinforma-
tion provided to them after some witnessed event (Belli, Lindsay, Gales, & McCarthy, 
1994; Lindsay, 1990; Loftus, Donders, Hoffman, & Schooler, 1989; Zaragoza & Lane, 
1994). These observations have had tremendous implications in applied settings, es-
pecially with regard to the reliability of eyewitnesses and with the nature of autobi-
ographical remembering (Belli & Loftus, 1996; Lindsay, 1994; Zaragoza, Belli, & Pay-
ment, in press). 
Despite the richness of work on the misinformation effect, very little is known 
about the role that schematic knowledge plays in the inducement of false memo-
ries that result from being misled. Research has indicated that schematic knowledge 
guides memory retrieval of common visual scenes (Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Fried-
man, 1979). In these experiments, participants are exposed to schema-consistent 
items, such as bookshelves in an academic office and schema-inconsistent items, such 
as a picnic basket in the same office. Just as with text passages, the research on visual 
scenes has also shown that expectations based on previous knowledge affect memory. 
However, the particular pattern of results depends, in part, on the type of memory 
test given. With recognition tests, participants are more accurate at discriminating be-
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tween old and new items if they are of low typicality (i.e., schema inconsistent) than if 
they are of high typicality (schema consistent), the aptly named typicality effect (Erd-
felder & Bredenkamp, 1998). In addition, participants will falsely recognize the pres-
ence of schema-consistent items that were never presented. Thus, people have been 
shown to falsely recognize typical information even when not misinformed. With free 
recall tests, participants remember more schema-consistent items than schema-incon-
sistent items as schematic knowledge guides the retrieval process (Brewer & Treyens, 
1981). 
Roediger et al. (2001) have investigated the role of schematic knowledge in a vari-
ation of the traditional misinformation effect experiment. In what they call the ‘Social 
Contagion’ paradigm (also see Meade & Roediger, 2002), participants are led to be-
lieve that they are participating in a memory experiment with a fellow undergradu-
ate. Unbeknownst to the subject, the fellow undergraduate is really a confederate of 
the experimenter. After viewing photographs of simple scenes (e.g., a kitchen, a tool-
box, a bedroom, etc.), the participant and confederate complete a session of collab-
orative recall, in which each person takes turns recalling one item from the scene in 
question. The key manipulation in this experiment is that the confederate deliberately 
feeds misinformation to the participant of items that were never present in the scene. 
Afterwards, participants are engaged in an individual recall session in which they at-
tempt to recall as many items from the scenes as possible. The potency of the mis-
information effect depends on whether the misinformed items were high in schema 
consistency (such as screws in a toolbox, termed as ‘high expectancy’ items) or low in 
schema consistency (such as a ruler in a toolbox, termed as ‘low expectancy’ items). 
Roediger et al. found a stronger social contagion misinformation effect for high-ex-
pectancy items in comparison to low-expectancy ones, after controlling for false recall 
of the same items when they were not presented as misinformation. 
Roediger et al.’s (2001) manipulation of misinformation through the social conta-
gion paradigm only included suggested details that added to the previously viewed 
scenes. Although this approach exemplifies much research on the misinformation ef-
fect, there is also a substantive degree of research that examines the misinformation 
effect when suggested items directly contradict items seen in an original event (e.g., a 
suggested stop sign in the place of a yield sign). Recent research by Frost (2000) has 
sought to elucidate the relative effects of additive versus contradictory misinforma-
tion on the subjective experience of false memory. Utilizing Tulving’s (1985) remem-
ber/know procedure, which requires participants to introspect as to whether they 
can explicitly remember the details of a recalled event or whether they just know that 
a detail was present in an event, Frost found that participants were more likely to 
falsely remember additive misinformation as having occurred in the event than con-
tradictory misinformation but only after a 1-week retention interval as opposed to a 
10-minute retention interval. Frost speculated that participants must have detected 
the contradiction at some level, whether conscious or not, when given contradictory 
misinformation and thus, were less likely to indicate a remember response for this 
type of misinformation. Importantly, Frost did not manipulate item typicality in these 
experiments. 
In the following experiment we conducted an exploratory investigation of the in-
teraction between the type of misinformation (i.e., additive vs. contradictory) and 
whether the critical items were schema consistent or schema inconsistent (i.e., high 
typicality vs. low typicality) on participants’ false remember and know responses. In 
particular, we were interested in replicating Roediger et al.’s (2001) findings with re-
gard to schematic influence on false memory, but within a traditional misinformation 
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effect paradigm versus the social contagion paradigm. If schematic knowledge guides 
memory retrieval, misinformation that is consistent with the schema should produce 
greater false memory than misinformation that is inconsistent. Therefore, we pre-
dicted that misinformation that is highly typical would produce greater false memory 
than low-typicality misinformation. Furthermore, low-typicality misinformation may 
make contradictory misinformation easier to detect, producing greater false memory 
for additive misinformation of highly typical items. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-four undergraduates from a large Midwestern university participated in the 
experiment for extra-course credit. They ranged in age from 18 to 36 with a mean age of 
19.7 years. Forty-three women (67%) and 21 men (33%) participated in the experiment. 
Materials 
Eight sets of critical items (four high typical and four low typical) were created 
in order to test memory for the visual scenes, as well as to introduce misinformation. 
Critical items from two high-typical sets and two low-typical sets were each presented 
in one of two critical scenes. The critical items are listed in Appendix A according to 
typicality and the critical scene in which they were presented. 
Seven digital color photographs depicted two critical and five filler scenes. The 
filler scenes consisted of an automobile body shop, a bedroom, a computer lab, a 
laundry room, and a classroom. The critical scenes consisted of a kitchen and living 
room of an apartment. The digital photographs were presented on Windows-based 
computers with 17” monitors. The experimental display was created using Media Lab 
software. The photographs were sized so that they filled approximately 90% of the 
screen. 
There were four versions created for each critical scene so as to depict one high-
typical item and one low-typical item in each version, counterbalancing each critical 
item across sets and scenes. Figure 1 shows a representative example of one version 
of the living room critical scene. Item typicality ratings were assessed in a pilot test of 
the photographs. 
Figure 1. An example of the critical living room scene with high-and low-typicality items indicated
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Twenty-four participants, who did not participate in the experiment, rated each 
item in terms of typicality on a 7-point Likert-type scale. They were asked, ‘How typ-
ical is this item in this scene?’ Each item was highlighted with an arrow to facilitate 
identification. The participants’ ratings indicated that high typicality items were per-
ceived as more typical (M = 6.38, SD = 0.44) than the low typicality items (M = 2.78, 
SD = 1.15), t(23) = 15.41, p < 0.01. Individual typicality ratings for each critical item 
can be seen in Appendix A. 
Five narratives that described various scenes were created in order to introduce 
misinformation. An example of the narrative for the Living Room Scene can be found 
in Appendix B. Two of the narratives described scenes that were novel (i.e., not 
shown in photographs; a backyard and a bathroom). Three of the narratives described 
scenes that were presented as photographs in the first phase of the experiment, one-
filler scene and two scenes containing critical items. The narratives ranged between 
304 and 375 words (M = 333 words). Eight versions of narratives for each scene were 
created; each version contained two items of misinformation, one high-typical item, 
and one low-typical item. Different versions of the narratives were created in order to 
completely counterbalance the shown and misled items across conditions. 
A 20-item cued recall test was used to test participants’ memory of the photo-
graphic scenes displayed in the event phase of the experiment. Four questions were 
asked for each of five scenes in the following order: laundry room, kitchen, bedroom, 
living room, and classroom. For the critical scenes, two questions referred to critical 
items that were present in the scene (i.e., one high-typicality item and one low-typical-
ity item) and two questions referred to critical items that were absent from the scene 
(i.e., again one high-typicality item and one low-typicality item). Questions were writ-
ten so as to cue the category of the item as well as its location within the context of the 
scene (e.g., ‘What was the SMALL KITCHEN APPLIANCE sitting on the counter in 
between the stove and the sink’ and ‘What KIND OF SPORTING EQUIPMENT was 
against the wall’ for high-typicality and low-typicality items, respectively). In addi-
tion, each cued recall question was followed by a remember/know judgment, which 
required participants to reflect on the qualities of their memories and decide whether 
they remembered associated details with their memory of the item or whether they just 
knew that the item they recalled was in the slides (Tulving, 1985). In addition to re-
member and know judgments, we included a guess judgment as participants were 
asked to report an item for all questions during the cued recall test. 
Design and procedure 
Three variables were manipulated in a 2 (event item: shown vs. not shown) x 2 
(misinformation: given vs. not given) x 2 (typicality: high vs. low) within-participants 
design. Thus, the factorial design resulted in eight experimental conditions: contra-
dictory misinformation when the misleading narrative contradicted an item that was 
present in the photographs (e.g., suggesting a toaster was in the kitchen when a coffee 
maker was actually present), additive misinformation when the misleading narrative 
merely added to the items present in the photographs (e.g., suggesting a toaster was 
in the kitchen when there was no small appliance in that part of the kitchen), misinfor-
mation control when an item was shown in the photographs and no misinformation 
was given, and guessing control when an item was neither presented nor suggested 
in the misleading narrative. These four conditions were reproduced for high-and low-
typicality items, and counterbalancing ensured that each item served in shown and 
suggested conditions equally often. 
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The experimental procedure consisted of three phases: the event, the postevent, and 
the memory test. On arriving to the laboratory and after completing informed consent 
forms, participants were presented with the event phase of the experiment. Participants 
were instructed that the purpose of the experiment was to investigate how well peo-
ple could visualize different scenes based either on viewing photographs of the scenes 
or reading narratives of the scenes. They were further instructed that in the first phase 
of the experiment they would be shown a series of photographs of common scenes and 
that they should attend to the photographs and try to remember as many details as pos-
sible. Participants then viewed a series of seven photographs for 15 seconds each. Af-
ter the presentation of each photograph terminated, the computer screen would refresh 
and prompt the participant to rate how well they could now visualize the just-viewed 
scene on a 7-point Likert-type scale. The sequence of photographs followed the same 
order for all participants: computer lab, laundry room, kitchen, classroom, living room, 
automobile body shop, and bedroom. Afterwards, participants were required to com-
plete find-word puzzles during a 10-minute delay period. 
During the postevent phase, participants read narratives that described com-
mon scenes, some of which were the same as had been viewed in the photographic 
sequence. Again, participants were instructed that the purpose of this phase of the 
experiment was to ascertain how well people could visualize common scenes after 
having read a description of the scene. Participants read each narrative at their own 
pace, scrolling down the screen for narratives too long to be completely displayed 
all at once. After each narrative was read, the screen on the computer refreshed and 
prompted the participants to provide visualization ratings. After the participants read 
all the narratives, they were given another 10-minute filled delay period during which 
they completed find-word puzzles. 
After the 10-minute delay period ended, participants were given a cued memory 
test on what they had seen in the photographs. Participants were explicitly instructed 
that the memory test referred to only what was seen in the photographs. Participants 
were also instructed on how to provide remember/know/guess judgments. Remem-
ber/know instructions were patterned after Rajaram (1993) with the addition of the 
guess judgments. Participants were instructed to indicate a guess response if they had 
no memory of the item in the scene and were purely guessing an item when prompted. 
The cued-recall test proceeded scene by scene with each screen shot displaying a single 
question. After participants indicated their response, the computer screen would refresh 
and prompt participants with a remember/know/guess judgment. After participants 
completed the cued recall test at their own pace, they answered basic demographic 
questions, and wrote brief definitions of remember and know judgments in their own 
words as an informal post-hoc check of their understanding of these measures. 
Results 
As our main interest centers on false memory as a result of misinformation, we 
first report analyses on false cued recall, followed by analyses of correct event cued 
recall. As we are interested in reports in which participants have the phenomenolog-
ical experience that the item had been visually presented in the original scenes, we 
only conduct analyses on the remember and know responses with guess responses 
being treated as a non-response. Analyses were conducted on combined remember 
and know responses as an overall measure of event or false memory, as well as re-
member and know responses, separately. 
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In order to investigate the effects of contradictory and additive misinformation 
with high and low typicality on false memory, we computed the difference scores 
between misinformation conditions and control conditions on the misled items that 
were falsely recalled for each participant. We used the difference scores to eliminate 
instances in which participants guessed the ‘misinformation item’ when they had in 
fact not been exposed to misinformation. Thus, the corrected CONTRADICTORY 
misinformation condition was computed by subtracting any reports of misinforma-
tion items of the misinformation control (shown event item/not given misled item) 
condition from the contradictory misinformation (shown/given) condition. 1 As for 
the corrected ADDITIVE misinformation condition, the computation of false reports 
was a bit more complicated. Because critical-item reports in the guessing control (not 
shown/not given) condition could have represented misled items half of the time and 
event items half of the time, we assigned a 0.5 probability to each report occurrence. 
We then subtracted the false memory reports in the guessing control condition from 
the additive misinformation (not shown/given) condition. 2 Analyses were performed 
on these difference scores. 
Table 1 shows the mean proportion of false remember and know responses by 
item typicality, type of misinformation, and whether the participant was misled or 
not. Separate 2 (Misinformation: Contradictory vs. Additive) x 2 (Typicality: High vs. 
Low) repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted on participants’ combined re-
member and know responses, as well as remember and know responses separately 
for false recall of postevent misinformation. The ANOVA for combined false-remem-
ber and false-know responses of postevent misinformation indicated a main effect for 
item typicality only, F(1, 63) = 10.96, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.15. Participants were more likely 
to falsely report low-typicality items (M = 0.13, SD = 0.24) in comparison to high-typ-
icality items (M = 0.01, SD = 0.18). Neither the main effect of misinformation nor the 
interaction between misinformation and typicality were significant, Fs(1, 63) < 1.03, ps 
> 0.31, η2s < 0.02. 
Table 1. Mean Proportion of False Remember and False Know Responses by Item Typicality, 
Type of Misinformation, and Condition 
Condition Additive Contradictory 
  Low High Low High
Misled
 Remember 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.01
 Know 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.00
Control 
 Remember 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 Know 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02
Difference 
 Remember 0.06 0.03 0.11 -0.02
 Know 0.06 0.02 0.03 -0.02
1 For example, a participant who reported misinformation in the contradictory misinformation (shown 
event item/ given misinformation) condition and guessed the misinformation item in the misinfor-
mation control (shown event item/not given misinformation) would be scored 1 – 1 = 0 for the cor-
rected CONTRADICTORY misinformation condition. 
2 For example, a participant who reported misinformation in the additive misinformation (not shown 
event item/ given misinformation) condition and guessed a critical item in the guessing control 
(not shown event item/not given misinformation) condition would be scored 1 – 0.5 = 0.5 for the 
corrected ADDITIVE misinformation condition. 
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Separate analyses of false-remember and false-know responses resulted in a signif-
icant main effect of item typicality for false-remember responses (low-typicality items 
M = 0.09, SD = 0.19; high-typicality items M = 0.01, SD = 0.14), F(1, 63) = 6.81, p < 0.05, 
η2 = 0.10, and a main effect that approached significance for false-know responses 
(low-typicality M = 0.05, SD = 0.17; high-typicality M = 0.00, SD = 0.12), F(1, 63) = 
3.40, p = 0.07, η2 = 0.05. The two-way interactions between misinformation and item 
typicality were not significant regardless of whether examining only false remember 
or false know responses, Fs(1, 63) < 1.83, ps > 0.18, η2 < 0.03.
We analyzed correct event recall in order to assess whether the presentation of 
misinformation for high-typicality items versus low-typicality items affected reports 
of shown items differentially. To measure event recall in an overall CONTROL condi-
tion, after correction for 0.5 probability, we subtracted reports of critical items in the 
guessing control (not shown/not given) condition from critical event items in the mis-
information control (shown/not given) condition. In the MISLED condition, we sub-
tracted critical event item reports in the additive misinformation (not shown/given) 
condition from the reports of critical event items in the contradictory misinformation 
(shown/given) condition. We conducted separate 2 (condition: misled vs. control) x 2 
(item typicality: high vs. low) repeated-measures ANOVAs on correct event recall dif-
ference scores for the combined remember and know responses, as well as remember 
and know responses separately. 
Significant findings were restricted to main effects of item typicality. None of the 
comparisons testing for a main effect of condition nor the condition by item typical-
ity interaction were significant, Fs(1, 63) < 1.13, ps > 0.29, η2s < 0.02. The ANOVA of 
the combined remember and know responses indicated a main effect of item typical-
ity, F(1, 63) = 16.09, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.20, in which participants recalled more low-typi-
cality event items (M = 0.34, SD = 0.32) than high-typicality event items (M = 0.13, SD 
= 0.26). Analyses conducted separately for remember and know responses revealed 
that the item-typicality effect was restricted to remember responses (low-typicality 
items M = 0.31, SD = 0.32; high-typicality items M = 0.11, SD = 0.21; F(1, 63) = 19.90, p 
< 0.001, η2 = 0.24) as the main effect of item typicality was not significant for know re-
sponses (F(1, 63) = 0.09, p = 0.77, η2 = 0.001). 
Discussion
The most surprising finding of this study was the main effect of typicality on 
false memory. Misinformation of low-typicality items produced more false mem-
ory than high-typicality items. This finding appears to contradict the results of 
Roediger et al. (2001) who found greater false memory for high-expectancy items 
than low-expectancy items. In addition, this typicality effect of false memory in-
cluded both false remember and false know responses. Thus, participants indi-
cated greater false episodic detail regarding low-typicality items than high-typi-
cality items. This suggests that misinformation of low-typicality items produces a 
‘strong’ false memory effect given the significance of misinformation typicality on 
false remember responses. 
The surprising nature of this finding warrants a closer inspection of Roediger et 
al.’s (2001) method. As mentioned previously, Roediger et al. manipulated the expec-
tancy of an item within a particular scene. However, both high-and low-expectancy 
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items were still schema consistent, just to varying degrees. In contrast, we manipu-
lated whether the critical item in question was schema consistent or schema inconsis-
tent via item typicality. Although this methodological difference alone does not ex-
plain the discrepancy in findings, the manipulation of expectancy versus typicality 
combined with the type of memory test employed may yield a clearer picture as to 
why we obtained disparate effects. 
In the present experiment, we utilized a cued-recall measure of memory, whereas 
Roediger et al. (2001) used a free-recall procedure. The free-recall procedure may in-
voke the use of schematic knowledge at retrieval because participants are only given 
the very general cue of the scene name. Thus, in order to help remember the items 
that were present in the scene, the participant may mentally ‘run-down’ the list of 
items typically present in such scenes. As such, participants in the Roediger et al. 
study may have been more likely to incorporate misleading, high-expectancy items 
that the confederate fed to them than low-expectancy items. This may also be the 
reason why Brewer and Treyens (1981) found greater memory of schema-consistent 
items during recall of actual places, but found that participants were better at discrim-
inating between present versus absent schema-inconsistent items in a recognition test 
of the same place. The recognition test provides a specific cue for the episodic detail 
of a scene, whereas the free-recall test provides a very general cue encouraging the re-
liance on general knowledge of a particular scene. Future research will need to ad-
dress the demands that different memory tests produce on participants’ reliance of 
general knowledge versus specific episodic detail with regard to the possible effects 
on the misinformation effect. 
The comparison between contradictory versus additive misinformation failed to 
indicate a difference between these two types of misinformation when subtracting the 
control conditions. Frost (2000) found greater false remember responses for additive 
misinformation compared to contradictory misinformation but only after a 1-week 
delay. Thus, the retention interval (i.e., 10 minutes) utilized in this experiment may 
not be long enough for differences between these two misinformation conditions to 
exert their effects. Future research should explore variations in the retention interval 
to determine whether additive versus contradictory misinformation yield disparate 
effects only at longer retention intervals. 
Concerning event memory, the findings of the present experiment confirm the ba-
sic typicality effect of recognition memory as seen in other research investigating the 
relationship between schematic knowledge and memory of complex visual scenes 
(Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Friedman, 1979). Low-typicality event items shown in pho-
tographic scenes during the event phase of the experiment were better remembered 
than high-typicality event items. Although we used a cued-recall procedure and not a 
recognition test, both are similar in that they focus the participants’ attention to some 
specific episodic detail in the visual scenes. As such, they do not invoke schematic re-
trieval as strongly as free-recall tests. What is surprising is the failure to find an in-
teraction between type of misinformation (i.e., contradictory vs. additive) and item 
typicality. If low-typicality items are better remembered than high-typicality items in 
a cued-recall procedure, it seems likely that contradictory misinformation provided 
about these items would be detected and rejected by participants. However, our delay 
may have been too short for any interaction to occur as Frost (2000) only found a dif-
ference between additive and contradictory misinformation after a 1-week delay. Fur-
ther investigations should determine whether this interaction can be found at longer 
retention intervals. 
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The present research extends our knowledge of the misinformation effect by ex-
amining the role of schematic knowledge on the creation of false memories. Although 
Roediger et al. (2001) also examined the influence of schematic knowledge on the cre-
ation of false memories, the current study differs in three important ways. First, Roed-
iger et al. utilized their innovative social-contagion paradigm, whereas we exam-
ined schematic knowledge in the traditional misinformation-effect paradigm. Second, 
Roediger et al., employed a free recall measure, whereas we used a cued recall pro-
cedure. As mentioned previously, free-recall measures have been shown to promote 
the use of schematic knowledge as an aid at retrieval (Brewer & Treyens, 1981). Third, 
Roediger et al. manipulated variations of schema consistency (yet even low-expec-
tancy items were still schema consistent) in what they dubbed expectancy. Our ma-
nipulations were more akin to manipulating schema-consistent versus schema-incon-
sistent items. 
Quite possibly, expectancy and schema consistency may lie on a single contin-
uum with high-expectancy items basically equaling high schema-consistent items 
on one end of the spectrum and schema-inconsistent items lying on the opposite 
end of the spectrum. On the other hand expectancy and schema consistency may re-
flect qualitatively different item dimensions. Although it may seem counterintuitive 
to have high-expectancy/schema-inconsistent items, it may be possible by introduc-
ing additional descriptive information about the scenes. For example, if the living 
room scene contains a low-typicality item such as a baseball bat or hockey stick, the 
participant could be informed that this is a living room of an athlete. In that case, 
the item might be expected, but still inconsistent with the scene. At any rate, regard-
less of whether a single continuum or separate dimensions, it is difficult to explain 
why high expectancy and schema inconsistency produce stronger misinformation 
effects than low-expectancy or schema-consistent items, respectively. These item di-
mensions may interact with the type of memory test given to measure the effect of 
misinformation. 
The discrepancy between the results of the current study and Roediger et al. (2001) 
may be due to differences in the memory test that was used, differences in the source 
of the misinformation (i.e., confederate peer vs. experimenter), and the nature of how 
the schematic consistency of the items were manipulated. Future research will need to 
address which of these differences explains the discrepancy in findings. Nonetheless, 
the result that schema-inconsistent items are more likely to produce false remember-
ing in cued-recall tests suggests a tantalizing new approach to the study of the mis-
information effect. Just as manipulations of schema consistency may heighten event 
memory for schema-inconsistent items when memory tests cue episodic detail, simi-
lar manipulations of misinformation make for stronger false memories. 
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Appendix A 
High- and Low-Typicality Critical Items By Critical Scene 
Scene                                                                                  Item Typicality 
                                                             High                                                            Low 
Kitchen Toaster (M = 7.00, SD = 0.00) Stapler (M = 2.17, SD = 1.52)
 Coffee Maker (M = 6.96, SD = 0.20) Tape dispenser (M = 2.18, SD = 1.61)
 Loaf of bread (M = 6.96, SD = 0.20) Toilet paper (M = 3.33, SD = 2.71)
 Apples (M = 6.88, SD = 0.45) Shampoo (M = 3.54, SD = 2.13)
Living Coat (M = 5.25, SD = 1.45) Wrench (M = 2.29, SD = 1.52)
Room Sweater (M = 5.33, SD = 1.37) Hammer (M = 2.33, SD = 1.52)
 Book (M = 6.29, SD = 0.91) Baseball bat (M = 3.46, SD = 1.62)
 Newspaper (M = 6.38, SD = 0.93) Hockey stick (M = 2.92, SD = 1.61)
Means and standard deviations for typicality ratings are indicated in parentheses. 
Appendix B 
Example of Narrative for the Living Room Scene
The living room scene depicted is that of a fairly typical living room scene in the 
United States. The walls are a white color and the carpet is a grayish tan. To keep the 
general color scheme consistent, the upholstery on a couch and a love seat is also light 
gray. To the back of the living room there is a screened patio door that leads to a deck. 
A green fern sitting on the floor breaks the monotony of the white and gray colors, 
and brings life and interest to the otherwise empty area in front of the patio door. An-
other element of interest in this room is a mounted pheasant, which is placed on the 
wall about 3–4 feet above the floor to the right from the patio door. A TV on a stand is 
angled in the corner to make sure that the screen is seen well from both couches. The 
TV stand also houses several electronic accessories such as a cable box and a DVD 
player. 
Against the right wall one can see a full sized stereo with several smaller objects 
grouped on and next to it, such as an athletics trophy, (a baseball bat, a hockey stick, 
x),a CD organizer, some individual CDs, and DVDs in cases. Above the stereo you 
can see part of a painting. On the floor between the coffee table and couch there is a 
pair of shoes (and a hammer, a wrench, x). There is the usual clutter on the coffee ta-
ble: three remote controls, several magazines, (a book, a newspaper, x), several CDs, 
a jar, and also a telephone. In the corner there is an armchair that has a blanket on it in 
front of a lamp. The lamp is turned on and emits soft yellow light. On the couch next 
to the coffee table there are several cushions, (a coat, a sweater, x), and on the wall 
there is another painting. [Note: Possible misinformation is in bold-face type. X indi-
cates no misinformation.]
